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Origins of Evolutionary Psychology 
The evolutionary study of the mind in the twentieth century has been marked by three 
self-conscious movements: classical ethology, sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology 
(capitalized to indicate that it functions here as a proper name). Classical ethology was 
established in the years immediately before the Second World War, primarily by Konrad 
Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen (Burckhardt, 1983). Interrupted by the war, the movement 
blossomed in the early 1950s, when ethologists established major research institutes in 
most developed countries and developed a successful sideline in popular science writing. 
From the outset, ethology sought to apply its methods for the comparative study of 
animal behavior to human beings, something that was especially prominent in more 
popular works. Lorenz’s On Aggression (1966a) is perhaps the best known of these 
works, but several other leading ethologists wrote advocating the application of the new 
evolutionary science of the mind to problems of international conflict and social unrest. 
The ethologist who focused most on human beings in his actual scientific work was 
Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt who throughout the 1960s and 1970s sought to document innate, 
universal behavior patterns in Homo sapiens through photography and film (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1989). 
 
Classical ethology was largely displaced in the 1970s by sociobiology (Wilson, 1975), a 
movement that sought to apply to humans a set of new mathematical techniques for the 
study of animal behavior. During the 1960s behavioral ecologists had come to view 
animal behaviors primarily as strategies in competitions between and within species. 
Models of these competitive interactions could be constructed using evolutionary game 
theory and the predictions of these models tested against actual behavior. Animal 
behaviors were expected to correspond to ‘evolutionarily stable strategies’, that is, to 
equilibria in the relevant game-theoretic models. The game-theoretic approach had the 
advantage that it did not require knowledge of the neural mechanisms underlyi g 
behavior (or the genetic mechanisms underlying its transmission). The early ethologists’ 
'hydraulic model' of neural mechanisms had collapsed during the 1950s as it became clear 
that the pre-war neuroscience that inspired it had not been borne out y further 
investigation. The hydraulic model also failed to accommodate many of the new 
behavioral phenomena uncovered as ethology matured (Hinde, 1956). No new model of 
similar generality was available to replace the hydraulic model and its relatives, making a 
method that dealt directly with behavior highly desirable. 
 
Sociobiologists also argued that their approach was intrinsically more scientific than 
classical ethology because it made predictions about behavior and tested them rather than
merely describing behavior and explaining it. This led to the hope that evolutionary 
models could guide psychological research and point it towards important phenomena 
that would otherwise be misunderstood or overlooked, an idea that remains centr l to 
today’s Evolutionary Psychology. In fact, the advocates of sociobiology included leading 
figures in today’s Evolutionary Psychology, such as Jerome Barkow, who expressed this 
viewpoint succinctly in his title ‘Classical Ethology: Empirical Wealth, Theoretical 
Dearth’ (Barkow, 1979). But despite such oppositional rhetoric, there was considerable 
continuity of practice and personnel between ethology and sociobiology. Richard 
Dawkins and Desmond Morris, for example, key figures in the popularization of 
sociobiology, were students of Niko Tinbergen and regarded sociobiology as a 
continuation of the tradition he had established  (see the introduction to Dawkins, 
Halliday, & Dawkins, 1991). 
 
At the end of the 1980s sociobiology n its turn came under attack from a new movement 
calling itself Evolutionary Psychology (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Crawford, 
Smith, & Krebs, 1987). Evolutionary Psychology argued that the whole project of 
explaining contemporary human behaviors as a direct result of adaptive evolution was 
misguided (Symons, 1992). The contemporary environment is so different from that in 
which human beings evolved that their behavior probably bears no resemblance to the 
behavior that was important in evolution. This problem had been identified by many of 
the best-known critics of sociobiology (e.g. Kitcher, 1985), but evolutionary psychology 
followed it up with a positive proposal. Evolutionary theory should be used to predict 
which behaviors would have been selected in postulated ancestral environments. Human 
behavior today can be explained as the output of mechanisms that evolved to produce 
those ancestral behaviors when these mechanisms operate in their very different, modern 
environment. Furthermore, the diverse behavior seen in different cultures may be the 
manifestations of a single, evolved psychological mechanism operating under a range of 
local conditions, an idea that originated in an offshoot of sociobiology known as 
Darwinian anthropology (Alexander, 1979). Refocusing research on the ‘Darwinian 
algorithms’ that underlie observed behavior, rather than the behavior itself lets the 
evolutionary psychologist ‘see through’ the interfering effects of environmental change 
and cultural difference to an underlying human nature. 
 
Adherents of today’s Evolutionary Psychology normally present their approach as 
something very novel, typically describing it as ‘the new science of the mind’(Cosmides 
and Tooby 2001). They allege that the social and behavioral sciences have until recently 
been dominated by ‘the standard social science model’ (SSSM). The SSSM denies the 
existence of any evolved features of the mind and grew out of the liberal political 
agendas in the 1960 which aimed to change traditional social behavior: ‘Not so long ago 
jealousy was considered a pointless, archaic institution in need of reform. But like other 
denials of human nature from the 1960s, this bromide has not aged well’, as Stephen 
Pinker puts it on the dustjacket of a recent book (Buss, 2000). But the presentation of 
Evolutionary Psychology as a rebellion against an anti-biological consensus in the social 
and behavioral sciences is at best a considerable exaggeration. Instead, Evolutionary 
Psychology represents the latest stage of a tradition of evolutionary psychology dating 
back at least to Lorenz. Nor is the public prominence of Evolutionary Psychology entirely 
new. Lorenz was as successful a popular author in the 1950s and 60s as Richard Dawkin  
in the 1970s and 80s. Furthermore, in some important respects, Evolutionary Psychology 
actually represents a return to the positions of classical ethology. Classical ethologists 
thought that modern human behavior was the - often maladaptive - result of ancient, 
evolved mechanisms operating in radically new environments. They also shared the 
‘modular’ conception of the mind, described below. Most importantly, classical ethology 
and Evolutionary Psychology offer very similar critiques of conventional psychology. 
Lorenz’s complaints were directed against those he liked to call 'American behaviorists'. 
The laboratory-based search for general laws of learning seemed to him as misguided as 
dropping automobiles from buildings under controlled conditions and writing down the 
results. Without an evolutionary perspective, he argued, psychology does not know what 
it is looking for and when it finds something it does not know what it is looking at (e.g. 
Lorenz, 1966b, p. 274). In the same way, advocates of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology 
argue that empirical psychology without an evolutionary perspective has no way to 
determine whether it is studying meaningful units of behavior or mental functioning: 
“Cognitive scientists will make far more rapid progress in mapping this evolved 
architecture if they begin to seriously incorporate knowledge from evolutionary biology 
and its related disciplines … into their repertoire of theoretical tools, and use theories of 
adaptive function to guide their empirical investigations”. (Tooby & Cosmides, 1998: 
195) 
 
Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Science 
The ethologists based their ideas about mental mechanisms on the neuroscience of the 
inter-war years. Evolutionary Psychology has turned to ‘classical’ cognitive science with 
its guiding idea that the mind is computer software implemented in neural hardware 
(Fodor, 1983; Marr, 1982). Evolutionary Psychology argues that the representational, 
information-processing language of classica cognitive science is ideal for describing the 
evolved features of the mind. Behavioral descriptions of what the mind does are useless 
because of the problem of changing environments described above. Neurophysiological 
descriptions are inappropriate, because behavioral ecology does not predict anything 
about the specific neural structures that underlie behavior. Models in behavioral ecology 
predict which behaviors would have been selected in the ancestral environment, but they 
cannot distinguish between diff rent mechanisms that produce the same output. Hence, if 
we accept the conventional view in cognitive science that indefinitely many different 
neural mechanisms could potentially support the same behavior, behavioral ecology 
predicts nothing about the brain except the information-pr cessing functions it must be 
able to perform: 
 
When applied to behavior, natural selection theory is more closely allied with the 
cognitive level of explanation than with any other level of proximate causation. This is 
because the cognitive level seeks to specify a psychological mechanism's function, and 
natural selection theory is a theory of function. (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987: 284) 
 
It is thus slightly confusing that Evolutionary Psychologists talk of discovering 
psychological ‘mechanisms’, a term which suggests theories at the neurological level. 
What ‘mechanism’ actually refers to in this context is a performance profile – an account 
of what output the mind will produce given a certain range of inputs.  
 
This fact that evolutionary reasoning yields expectations about the performance profile of 
the mind fits neatly with the explanatory framework of classical cognitive science. 
According to the influential account given by David Marr (Marr, 1982), explanation in 
cognitive science works at three, mutually illuminating levels. The highest level concerns 
the tasks that the cognitive system accomplishes – recovering the shape and position of 
objects from stimulation of the retina, for example. The lowest level concerns th  
neurophysiological mechanisms that accomplish that task – t e neurobiology of the 
visual system. The intermediate level concerns the functional profile of those 
mechanisms, or as it is more usually described, the computational process that is 
implemented in the neurophysiology. Hypotheses about the neural realization of the 
computational level constrain hypotheses about computational processes: psychologists 
should only propose computational models that can be realized by neural systems. 
Conversely, hypotheses about computational processes guide the interpretation of neural 
structure: neuroscience should look for structures that can implement the required 
computations. Similar relations of mutual constraint hold between the level of task 
description and the level of computational processes. But there remains something of a 
puzzle as to how the highest level - the task description - is to be specified other than by 
stipulation. It seems obvious that the task of vision is to represent things around us, but 
what makes this true? According to Evolutionary Psychology, claims about task 
descriptions are really claims about evolution. The overall task of the mind is survival 
and reproduction in the ancestral environment and the sub-t sks p rformed by parts of the 
mind correspond to separate adaptive challenges posed by the ancestral environment. It 
would obviously have been useful for our ancestors to be able to see, so we should expect 
people to have a visual system. This kind of thinking becomes useful when the function 
of a psychological mechanism is not as blindingly obvious as in the case of vision. What, 
for example, is the task description for the emotions system, or for individual emotions 
such as jealousy or grief? Evolutionary Psychology argues that in s ch cases it should be 
evolutionary thinking that sets the agenda for cognitive science, telling it what to look for 
and how to interpret what it finds. 
 
The Massive Modularity Thesis 
One of the best-known features of Evolutionary Psychology is the ‘massive modularity 
thesis’ or ‘swiss army knife model’, according to which the mind contains few if any 
general-purpose cognitive mechanisms. The mind is a collection of separate ‘modules’ 
each designed to solve a specific adaptive problem, such as mate-recognition or the 
enforcement of female sexual fidelity. The flagship example of a mental module is the 
‘Language Acquisition Device’ - the mechanism that allows human infants to acquire a 
language in a way that it is very widely believed would not be possible using any general-
purpose learning rules (Pinker, 1994). Other well-known examples include the perceptual 
input devices for which the modularity concept was originally introduced (Fodor 1983). 
The massive modularity thesis is an example of the kind of evolutionary guidance for 
cognitive science described in the last section. Evolutionary Psychology argues that 
evolution would favor multiple modules over domain general cognitive mechanisms 
because each module can be fine-tuned for a specific adaptive problem. So cognitive 
scientists should look for domain specific effects in cognition and should conceptualize 
their work as the search for and characterization of mental modules.  
 
The Monomorphic Mind Thesis 
The leading Evolutionary Psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides have argued 
strongly for the ‘monomorphic mind thesis’ or 'psychic unity of humankind' (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1992: 79).  This thesis states that any differences that exist in the cognitive 
adaptations of individuals or groups are not due to genetic differences. Psychological 
differences between people are always, or almost always, due to environmental factors 
that trigger different aspects of the same developmental program. If true, this would make 
cognitive adptations highly atypical, since most human traits display considerable 
individual variation related to differences in genotype.  All human beings have eyes, but 
these eyes exhibit differences in color, size, shape, acuity and susceptibility to various 
forms of degeneration over time, all due to differences in genotype.  It has been known 
for half a century that wild populations of most species contain substantial genetic 
variation, and humans are no exception.   
 
Tooby and Cosmides offer one main argument for th  conclusion that the genes involved 
in producing cognitive adaptations will be the same in all human individuals: 
 
‘Complex adaptations necessarily require many genes to regulate their 
development, and sexual recombination makes it combinatorially improbable that 
all the necessary genes for a complex adaptation would be together at once in the 
same individual, if genes coding for complex adaptations varied substantially 
between individuals.  Selection, interacting with sexual recombination, enforces a 
powerful tendency towards unity in the genetic architecture underlying complex 
functional design at the population level and usually the species level as well.’ 
(Tooby and Cosmides 1990a: 393)   
  
The authors only apply this argument to psychological adaptations, but its logic extends 
to all traits with many genes involved in their etiology.  The argument fails because it 
assumes that development is a mechanical consequence of the exact sequence of genes on 
each chromosome. What Cosmides an  Tooby seem to have overlooked is the 
phenomena described by C.H Waddington in the 1940s as 'developmental canalisation': 
development is buffered against genetic variation, as well as against environmental 
variation. This is why surprisingly many gene knock-out experiments produce negative 
results. Disabling a gene known to be involved in a developmental pathway frequently 
produces no effect (‘null phenotype’), because development contains positive and 
negative feedback mechanisms that increase transcription of the required gene product 
from the other allele, initiate transcription from another gene copy or initiate transcription 
of a different gene product that can produce the same outcome (Fr eman, 2000). On a 
larger scale, it has becom a commonplace amongst evolutionary developmental 
biologists that complex phenotypic features of organisms can be conserved over 
evolutionary time despite changes in the specific genes used to construct them and even 
in the general form of the developmental pathway by which they are constructed (Raff, 
1996; Wagner, 1994).  
 
One reason for the popularity of the doctrine of the monomorphic mind is probably as a 
bulwark against racism.  If all human being have substantially the same genes, thn racial 
differences are superficial and modifiable. But no such bulwark is necessary. If we 
assume that variation in evolved human phenotypes roughly mirrors the known variation 
in human genotypes, then it follows that the vast majority of traits are pancultural and 
that the differences between human groups are dwarfed by the differences between 
individuals within those groups (Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, & Piazza, 1994). 
 
Alternatives to Evolutionary Psychology 
Many authors disagree with one or more elements of the Evolutionary Psychology 
program. Some of the strongest rejections of the whole program can be found in Rose and 
Rose, 2000. Jerry Fodor, one of the originators of Evolutionary Psychology’s preferred 
framework for cognitive science, rejects the massive modularity thesis and has expressed 
considerable scepticism about the value of evolutionary thinking as a heuristic for 
cognitive science (Fodor, 2000). Objections from several authors to the massive 
modularity thesis and to claims about the heuristic value of evolutionary thinking are 
surveyed in Chapter 13 of  Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999. Critics of a different stripe agree 
with Evolutionary Psychology that evolutionary thinking has considerable implications 
for cognitive science but disagree about what it implies. Two recent collections of papers 
that include many pro-ev lutionary criticisms of this sort are Holcomb, In Press and 
Scher & Rauscher, In Press. Finally, a ‘developmentalist’ tradition in behavior research, 
also with its roots in classical ethology, has criticized both sociobiology and Evolutionary 
Psychology for failing to integrate the Darwinian study of behavior with the study of how 
behavior develops. An accessible introduction to this tradition is provi ed by Bateson and 
Martin, 1999. 
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